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Dr. Abdallah Fawzy Abdallah Al-Janainy :: Publications:

China's Stance on Suez Crisis (1956)
Authors: Abdallah Fawzy Abdallah Al-Janainy
Year: 2016
Keywords: Not Available
Journal: Middle East Research Journal, Middle East Research Center, Ain-Shams University, Vol. 39, September 2016
Volume: Middle East Research Journal, Middle East Research Center, Ain-Shams University, Vol. 39, September 2016
Issue: Middle East Research Journal, Middle East Research Center, Ain-Shams University, Vol. 39, September 2016
Pages: Not Available
Publisher: Not Available
Local/International: International
Paper Link: Not Available
Full paper Not Available
Supplementary materials Not Available

The Sino-Egyptian relations are characterized as historic. Their roots are deep and extended across all fields, whether political, economic, social, or military. The year of 2016 witnesses many connotations, including the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the efforts of both countries to consolidate such relations as they are aware of their worth and value towards each other. China with its cultural, human, natural, economic, military, and technological on one hand, and Egypt with its ancient civilization on the other, as well as its position on the Arab and African levels. These factors serve as points of rapprochement and convergence between China and Egypt, without other Arab and African countries, and then the Chinese government actively seeks towards that. Egypt was the first country to recognize it, from which China gets several gains at the regional and international level. Egypt breaks the barrier of isolation imposed on the State of China, and then a number of Arab countries follow it, as China becomes recognized by both Syria and Yemen in the same year, and then the remaining Arab countries all recognize it. China establishes an embassy in Cairo, through which it exercises a broad activity and great publicity in the Arab and African worlds. On the other hand, Egypt endures the consequences and repercussions of this move, as the Western countries, particularly the United States, condemn this convergence as they are aware of the seriousness of this matter, which is not only in favor of China, but also in favor of the communist camp. This matter adversely affects the Western interests in the Middle East, as well as in the course of the cold war between the Western and Eastern camps. Therefore, Egypt's recognition of China - next to other more influential factors such as the Czech arms deal and the nationalization of Egypt's Suez Canal Company – becomes a cause of occurrence of the Suez crisis in 1956 and also the tripartite aggression on Egypt, which serves as the first challenge for the emerging relations. In that regard, China has to announce its position either to prove to Egypt that its move was right and deserves the reimbursement than the implications, and then declares its support through the stages of the crisis as part of giving back, and thus irritates England. This matter negatively affects China, because England is the only Western country (with prestige and importance), which proceeds to establish diplomatic relations with it. On the contrary, it takes a negative attitude to satisfy its interests in an attempt to gain the trust of the rest of the Western countries, especially France, which is on the verge of recognition before the outbreak of the Suez crisis, and either follow a third balanced plan by which it preserves its interests with both parties. Accordingly, this study answers these three hypotheses, and highlights China's stance at all levels of the crisis.

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